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1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a very meaningful role in todays nancial mar-
kets. According to Moodys (2006) - one of the largest CRAs worldwide - , the
volume of rated debt issues increased globally from US$ 3,500 billion in the year
2002 to over 8,000 billion in 2006.1 In principle, credit ratings should serve as
third-party opinions about the solvency of a debt instrument and should reduce the
information asymmetry between an issuer of a debt instrument and the potential
investors, and therefore improve e¢ ciency and transparency in nancial markets.
The CRAs pronounce that their credit ratings should not be interpreted as default
probabilities and that credit ratings are rather opinions about risk only. The higher
is the credit rating of a debt instrument, the less likely it should be to default and
the longer it should take to default. A closer look at corporate scandals and nancial
crisis during the last years reveals that CRAs have been involved several times and
have been confronted with heavy criticism for publishing inaccurate credit ratings.
Examples are the Asian crisis, where the CRAs gave Thailand an investment-grade
rating until ve months after the start of the crisis or the Enron case, where the
CRAs gave Enron investment-grade until days before it went bankrupt. Another
recent example for public discussion about the behavior of CRAs is the debacle of
subprime lending in the USA with its impact on nancial markets globally.2 Fur-
thermore, CRAs very often are confronted with the suspicion of being exposed to
conicts of interest as mostly the issuers of the debt instrument pay for the credit rat-
ing, which fees account for about 90 per cent of the CRAsrevenues, and as CRAs
o¤er additional consulting services to their clients. Again, the crisis in subprime
1A closer look at the market structure of CRAs shows that the market is dominated by three
big global rms (Moodys Investors Services, Standard & Poors and Fitch Ratings). According to
published data from Moodys (see Moodys, 2006) the global industry market share of the three
big agencies was estimated to be 95% in 2006. The largest CRA is Standard & Poors with a
market share of 40%, followed closely by Moodys with 39% and Fitch with 16%.
2Due to the rise in housing prices the volume of subprime loans increased rapidly. Those loans
where securitized into mortgage backed securities and again these were securitized into collater-
alized debt obligations (CDOs). Those complex debt contracts received a very high rating from
the CRAs, comparable to government bonds. In the rst half of 2007 CDOs lost almost 40% of
their value. In order to limit turbulences, the ECB injected around 200 billion Euro and the FED
around 40 billion US Dollars emergency liquidity in August 2007.
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lending can serve as an illustration of that issue. The CRAs not only issued credit
ratings for structured nance instruments, but also supported investment banks in
designing them (see for example Mason & Rosner, 2007).
Despite these objections, CRAs remained themselves largely unregulated, but the
discussion on further regulation is active in the media as well as in institutions of
nancial market supervision. In 2005 the SEC (securities and exchange commission)
published a report on the behavior of CRAs and issued a concept release on how the
regulation of CRAs should be changed. Amongst others regulation would be needed
for requirements on the qualications of rating-analysts, the avoidance of conicts
of interest in the presence of additional services of CRAs and the current monitoring
of CRAs.3 In 2004 the IOSCO4 published a code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs
in which was proposed amongst others that the quality and integrity of the rating-
procedure should be warranted and that credit ratings should be free from conicts
of interest.5 In September 2006, the U.S. legislations passed the "Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act 2006", with the goal to improve the quality of credit ratings
"for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability,
transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry" (see CRA Reform Act,
2006). After the subprime loan crisis in 2007, the EU-commission and US politicians
blamed the CRAs of being jointly responsible for the nancial crisis. The EU-
commission considered to react with legal regulations for the credit rating agencies
and also US authorities announced to investigate the role of CRAs in the subprime
loan crisis that was set o¤ in August 2007. However, very little progress has been
made in implementing those proposals in national laws and regulations.
This paper contributes to the question whether CRAs should be regulated and
especially concentrates on the allegation of inaccurate credit ratings and adverse
e¤ects of conicts of interest. The paper studies the optimal regulation of CRAs
in a model where rating quality is unobservable and enforcement of regulation is
costly. The applied theoretical model is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), where
3see Ban (2004)
4The IOSCO (International organization of securities commissions) is a union of national insti-
tutions of nancial supervision of over one hundred countries.
5see IOSCO (2004) and Ban (2004).
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the regulation of auditing rms is analyzed. The model considers a representative
investment bank6 that wants to invest in a risky portfolio and needs to raise debt
from external investors to nance the investment. A CRA has a costly evaluation
technology and issues a credit rating for the debt contract, which is made available
for external investors. The credit rating is based on the risk of the underlying
portfolio and a credit rating is being issued, if a CRA is assigned by the investment
bank. In the setup, the external investors use the credit rating for their investment
decision and the credit rating helps to allocate investment more e¢ ciently, compared
to the case without a credit rating. If rating quality is unobservable, the CRA has
an incentive to lower the rating quality, because the costs can then be reduced and
hence the prots increased.
The model motivates a rationale for regulation by showing that due to the un-
observable rating quality the allocation of investment becomes ine¢ cient and social
welfare ine¢ ciently low. In a next step a regulator with a costly technology may de-
tect compliance with a minimum rating standard with a certain probability. Being
benevolent, the regulator decides on the minimum rating standard and the costly
detection e¤ort employed in regulation in order to maximize social welfare. The
introduction of regulation leads to the trade-o¤ that more e¢ cient allocation of
investment leads to a rise in social welfare, but because regulation is costly, to a re-
duction in social welfare. The results show that the optimal rating standard is lower
than the rst-best rating quality. In order to give consideration to the fact that
CRAs may be exposed to conicts of interest, the model is extended in a next step
by assuming that the rated issuer may bribe the CRA in exchange for a better credit
rating and that CRAs do not only rate but also have the ability to o¤er consulting
services.7 It will be shown that with the joint provision of ratings and consulting
services the possibility of collusion may arise, which could have negative e¤ects on
social welfare. The model shows that on the one hand the regulator could get rid
6By using an investment bank in our model setup we give consideration to the extensive public
discussion about the role of credit rating agencies in the subprime loan crisis in 2007. Our model
of course can be generalized by using the term "rm" or "nancial intermediary", that has a risky
investment project and needs external funds to nance the project.
7Associated with the subprime loan crisis in August 2007, CRAs were under suspicion to give
too favourable credit ratings for structured debt products, because CRAs did not only rate the
products, but also were involved in designing products with a good credit rating.
4
of the collusion problem by forbidding the joint provision of ratings and consulting
services, but on the other hand that this may not always be optimal from a welfare
perspective. That paper contributes to the theoretical literature on CRAs by lling
the gap on the optimal regulation of CRAs and by giving consideration to broadly
discussed issues regarding the alleged inglorious role of CRAs in nancial markets
in the recent past.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a re-
view of the related literature about the role of CRAs in nancial markets and the
regulation of CRAs. Section 3 introduces the framework of the model, motivates
the rationale for regulation when rating quality is unobservable and analyzes the
optimal regulation. In section 4 the model is extended by introducing conicts of
interest between the issuer of the debt instrument and the CRAs which may emerge
by the joint provision of ratings and additional consulting services. Finally, section
5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Richard Cantor (2004) points to the fact that the literature on the role of CRAs has
almost exclusively an empirical focus. In the small category of theoretical literature,
Millon & Thakor (1984) analyze the rationale, why CRAs exist and motivate their
existence with the possibility of information and risk sharing. They conclude that
CRAs might not have an incentive to employ costly e¤ort into the process of inform-
ation production. However, neither conicts of interest nor regulation of CRAs are
considered. Regulation is not considered either in Kuhner (2001), who analyzes the
role of CRAs in times of enhanced systemic risk, where CRAs act as frontrunners in
a Bayesian herding process. Boom (2001) concentrates on the demand and the price
for a rating of a monopolistic rating agencies. But again, no regulatory issues are
incorporated explicitly in the model. Mostly related with our approach is the contri-
bution of Mukhopadhyay (2004), where moral hazard aspects are considered. That
paper motivates the moral hazard problem with unobservable evaluation standards,
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which CRAs use in the rating process, and show, somewhat questionable from a
policy perspective, that a regulator can enforce an evaluation standard with incent-
ive payments to the rating agency. But again, this contribution neither considers
conicts of interest between the CRA and the rated rm nor welfare implications
of regulation. Another interesting theoretical motivation for the role of CRAs in
nancial markets is Boot et al. (2006). They show that credit ratings can act as a
coordination mechanism in the presence of multiple equilibria and that credit ratings
then have the ability to improve nancial market stability. Despite those valuable
results, issues regarding possible conicts of interest, moral hazard and regulation
of CRAs are not addressed in this paper. As will be shown in section 3 in more
detail, credit ratings of CRAs and auditing reports of auditing rms are products
with related characteristics. Hence, the framework of analyzing the behavior and
regulation of auditing rms is closely related to the analysis of CRAs. Dye (1993)
analyzes the role of auditing standards and litigation against auditors. They derive
auditorsresponses to auditing standards and optimal liability rules. Pagano & Im-
mordino (2007) extend the analysis of auditing rms by focusing on unobservable
auditing quality, conicts of interest and optimal regulation.
3 The Model
This section introduces a framework for analyzing the regulation of credit rating
agencies. The model is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), where the optimal
regulation of auditing is analyzed, and on Dye (1993), who studies the relationship
between auditing standards and auditors wealth. The rationale for regulation will be
derived by the assumption that the quality of credit ratings is neither observable nor
contractible. It will be shown that a minimum rating standard, set by the regulator,
can improve the outcome from a welfare perspective. The regulatory issues for
auditing rms in Pagano & Immordino (2007) are closely related to those of CRAs.
Similar to CRAs, auditing rms serve as information providers for investors and
are assigned and remunerated by the audited rm. One di¤erence is that auditing
rms provide information to shareholders, who provide equity, whereas the CRAs
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provide information to investors, which provide debt nance. Another di¤erence is
that rms are legally forced very often to be audited whereas getting rated is mostly
voluntary. At last, the product of auditing rms and CRAs is di¤erent from a legal
perspective. As mentioned in the introduction, until today a credit rating has to be
regarded as an opinion on the default probability only, whose accuracy cannot be
sued by the clients of the CRA in contrast to auditing rms.8
At rst we construct a benchmark model with the assumption that the rating
quality is observable and contractible. After relaxing this assumption, we show
in a next step that the equilibrium rating quality becomes ine¢ ciently low. By
introducing a regulator with a costly detection technology, we show that a minimum
rating standard improves e¢ ciency in the allocation of investment and that welfare
will be increased. Taking into account that CRAs in the real world have often been
blamed to prot from market power, we extend our analysis by distinguishing the
cases of perfect competition and market power in the CRA sector.
3.1 Investment Bank, Investors, and the Credit Rating
Agency
We assume an environment with universal risk neutrality and a continuum of in-
vestment banks (IB). A representative IB has the possibility to invest in a risky
portfolio. To nance investment of the portfolio, it has to raise debt nance d from
external investors.9 The goal of the representative IB is to maximize its prots from
its investment possibilities. Without debt nance, we assume that the IB is not able
to invest and the nal prot of the IB would then be zero.
The risk of the portfolio can be characterized as follows: the nal return of the
portfolio may turn out to be high or low, so there are two possible states (s) of
the portfolio s = g (good) or s = b (bad). The type of the portfolio is a priori
8In the aftermath of the Enron debacle, CRAs avoided regulatory scrutiny and litigation in
contrast to auditing rms, who were convicted to pay high nes. Also the regulatory oversight of
auditing rms was strengthend in contrast to CRAs (see for example Zachariahs, 2007).
9We assume that the IB has no own funds initially and therefore has to nance its operation
entirely via debt. To keep the model tractable, we assume that external investors require an interest
rate of zero.
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unknown to the IB. If the portfolio is in the good state, its nal value e	 is given
by a high payo¤ 	g, and if the portfolio is in the bad state, the nal value e	 is
given by a low payo¤ 	b. We assume that each investment bank in the economy
invests only in one portfolio in one period. Therefore, the nal value of the portfolio
is equal to the gross prot of the IB in one period. The portfolio will be in the
good state with unconditional probability p and in the bad state with probability
1   p. Since we assume a continuum of IBs, the unconditional probability p is
also the fraction of IBs in the economy, which has the possibility to invest in a
good portfolio.10 We assume that p is exogenous and a priori known by the IBs
and the external investors and that neither IBs nor investors have further private
information about the quality of the portfolio. If the portfolio is in the good state,
the payo¤ is assumed to be higher than the required debt repayment to the investors
d, but if the project turns out to be in the bad state, the payo¤ is assumed to be
lower than d: 	g > d > 	b. Given that the fraction of good IBs p is publicly
known, the expected unconditional gross prot of the representative IB is given by
	 = p	g + (1  p)	b. We assume that the expected gross prot of the IB exceeds
the required debt repayment (	 > d). Therefore, risk neutral investors are willing
to provide debt nance, given the information about p. Obviously, all IBs that seek
debt nance, will be served irrespective if their portfolio is actually good or bad.
The representative credit rating agency (CRA) has a costly technology that
enables the CRA to distinguish, whether an IB has the possibility to invest in a
good or a bad portfolio. A single CRA is assumed to rate only one portfolio per
period. The CRA is able to detect a signal about the state of the IBs portfolio and
accordingly issues a credit rating r that reects whether the banks portfolio is good
or bad. If the CRA comes to the conclusion that the portfolio is good, it issues a
good credit rating r = g and reversely a bad credit rating r = b.11 Since the rating
technology is costly, the CRA charges a rating fee  from the rated investment bank.
The issued credit rating, which is made available to external investors, inuences the
10In the paper we will analogously use the terms "good" IB and "bad" IB.
11A good credit rating r=g can be regarded as reecing an "investment grade" credit rating and
a bad credit rating r=b as a "speculative grade" credit rating.
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expected prots of the IB and the decision of the investors to provide debt nance.12
According to Dye (1993)13 we assume that the CRA can choose the precision of the
signal about the state of the rated portfolio. We interpret the precision of the CRA
as the quality of a credit rating q. The quality of a credit rating can be interpreted as
the qualication of the sta¤, the information technology or the internal organization
of the CRA. The CRA can choose the quality of the credit rating q 2 [0; 1]. The
rating technology is assumed to be perfectly accurate, if the CRA observes a good
signal, but that it may be inaccurate after observing a bad signal. The conditional
probabilities that the issued credit ratings after observing a good and a bad signal
are correct are given by:
Pr(r = g j s = g; q) = 1 (1)
Pr(r = b j s = b; q) = q
It is obvious that the credit rating is always accurate in the case of a good signal.
In the case of a bad signal, the accuracy of the credit rating increases with the quality
that is employed in the rating process. The technology of the CRA can be described
in such a way that credit ratings are biased upwards, meaning that after observing a
good signal, the credit rating is perfectly accurate, but after observing a bad signal
only with a certain probability. In the case of a bad signal, the CRA will issue an
inaccurately good credit rating with a probability (1   q), while the probability of
issuing a bad credit rating after observing a good signal is zero.14
Given the technology of the CRA, the conditional probability of a rated portfolio
being in a bad state after getting a bad credit rating can be calculated using Bayes
rule:
Pr(s = b j r = b) = Pr(s = b \ r = b)
Pr(r = b)
= 1;
12Since we assume that an IB invests in only one portfolio for which it seeks external nance,
the rating of the portfolio is identical to a rating of the IB itself. Unlike in reality, the model does
not discriminate between issuer and issue credit ratings.
13The assumptions on the rating technology of the CRA are based on Dye (1993), who analyzes
the relationship between auditing standards, auditors wealth and litigation.
14With that assumption about the technology of CRA we take into account the real world
criticism that CRA may issue too favourable ratings and that ratings may be inaccurately adjusted
in the case of a deterioration of an instruments or a rms conditions.
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while the conditional probability of a portfolio with a bad credit rating, being in
a good state is given by:
Pr(s = g j r = b) = 0:
The probability that the rated IB is in a good state, conditional on a good credit
rating, is given by the following expression:
Pr(s = g j r = g) = Pr(s = g \ r = g)
Pr(r = g)
=
p
p+ (1  p) (1  q) ;
while the probability that the rated IB is in a bad state, conditional on a good
credit rating, is given by:
Pr(s = b j r = g) = (1  p) (1  q)
p+ (1  p) (1  q) :
Using the conditional probabilities above, the expected nal prot of the rated
IB after deduction of the debt repayment to external investors d, conditional on a
good credit rating, can be formulated as:
E (r = g) = Pr(s = g j r = g)	g + Pr(s = b j r = g)	b   d
 ! E(r = g) = p	g + (1  p) (1  q)	b
p+ (1  p) (1  q)   d  	  d: (2)
and the expected nal prot of the rated IB, conditional on a bad credit rating
can be written as:
E (r = b) = Pr(s = g j r = b)	g + Pr(s = b j r = b)	b   d
 ! E (r = b) = 	b   d < 0:
Given the technology of the CRA, the expected prot of the rated IB in the case
of a good credit rating is larger than the expected prot without a credit rating (see
equation (2)). Conversely, the expected value of the IB with a bad credit rating is
smaller compared with the case without a credit rating (	b < 	). Since 	b < d, it
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is rational for the external investors not to provide d and the nal expected prot
in the case of a bad rating is zero (E (r = b) = 0). It is obvious that investment
will only take place in the cases of a good credit rating or without a credit rating,
since the expected prot of the IB is positive in these two cases, meaning that the
investors get back their funds. In the case of a bad credit rating investors are not
willing to provide debt nance.15
The question on hand is: when is the IB willing to obtain a credit rating from a
CRA? The IB can only observe the unconditional probability p and is only willing
to pay a rating fee  for a credit rating, if the expected prot with a credit rating
is larger than the expected prot without a credit rating. The expected prot with
credit rating net of the rating fee is given by:
R = Pr (r = g)E(r = g) + Pr(r = b)E(r = b)  :
If no credit rating is assigned, the expected prot is given by: n = 	   d. The
expected prot of a credit rating for the IB (IB) that can be interpreted as the
"informative value" is therefore given by:
IB = R   n (3)
 ! IB = q (1  p) (d 	b)   (3)
If equation (3) is larger or equal zero
 
IB  0, a credit rating has informative
value and it is then optimal for the IB to obtain a credit rating.16 If instead equation
(3) would be negative
 
IB < 0

, the credit rating has no informative value and
henceforth the IB would decide not to assign a credit rating. In that case, credit
ratings do not play a useful role. From equation (3) can be derived that the value
added of a credit rating is increasing in the quality of the credit rating q, decreasing in
15The pivotal criterion for external investors is the expected prot of the IB. The group of
external investors is assumed to be homogenous and they are not restricted by regulation to invest
only in products with a certain credit rating.
16We assume that credit ratings are not mandatory. If equation (3) is zero, the IB is indi¤erent
between getting a rating or not. In case of indi¤erence we assume that the IB chooses to obtain a
credit rating.
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Figure 1: Interactions between CRA, IB, and investors.
the unconditional probability p and the rating fee . If the fraction of good portfolios
becomes larger, the informative value of a credit rating decreases. Furthermore,
equation (3) is increasing in the term (d 	b), which can be interpreted as a measure
of potential misallocated investment that can be prevented by a credit rating of a
CRA about the IBs portfolio. The larger the possible misallocation, the higher
is the value of the credit rating. To simplify notation in the following, we dene
m  d   	b. We assume that the parameters p, , 	b and d are public observable
and given exogenous. Hence, the value of equation (3) depends on the rating quality,
which is set by the CRA. Obviously, if the rating quality would be observable for the
IB, the IB would be able to observe the exact value of the credit rating via equation
(3), while it is not the case if rating quality would be unobservable. We take a closer
look at that issue in part 3.2. Figure 1 summarizes the interactions between the
three agents - IB, CRA and external investors - in the framework of the model.
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3.2 Demand and Supply of Observable and Unobservable
Rating Quality
We assume that the CRA produces only one credit rating per period and that it
faces costs per rating c(q), which are increasing and convex in the rating quality q.17
Revenues are created by charging a rating fee  from the rated IB. Regarding the
setting of the rating fee we distinguish the case of perfect competition and market
power in the sector of CRAs.
i. More CRAs than clients: If there are more CRAs than clients in the
economy, the situation can be regarded as perfect competition among CRAs. In that
scenario, the CRA would set the rating fee equal to the costs per rating: (q) = c (q)
and therefore make zero prots. If the quality of the credit rating is observable and
contractible, the IB would demand a rating quality that maximizes the additional
prot of getting rated in equation (3) that includes the rating fee (q). We have
assumed above that the costs per rating are increasing and convex in q. Since the
rating fee  has to cover the costs per rating, the rating fee is increasing and convex
in q, too. Due to the convexity of c, the IBs prot from getting rated
 
IB

,
expressed in equation (4), is concave and maximization with respect to the rating
quality leads to an internal maximum:
max
q
IB (q) = q (1  p)m  c (q) (4)
The rst order condition is given by:
(1  p)m = c0 (q) (5)
If the rating quality would be observable and contractible, the IB would require a
quality, where the marginal cost of increasing the rating quality equals the marginal
revenue of a higher rating quality. Solving the rst order condition for q leads to
17The cost function has the following properties: c0(q) > 0, c00(q) > 0 with lim
q!0
c(q) = 0 and
lim
q!1
c(q) =1, and c(0) = 0.
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the rst-best rating quality q 2 [0; 1]. The characteristics of the rst-best rating
quality are summarized in proposition 1.18
Proposition 1 If rating quality is observable and contractible, the rst-best rating
quality q becomes smaller, if the unconditional probability of the IBs portfolio being
in a good state p increases and becomes larger, if the size of the potential misalloca-
tion of investment m without a rating increases. The rst-best rating quality becomes
larger, if the marginal costs per rating c0 (q) become smaller.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
The value of getting a credit rating becomes larger, if the fraction of good port-
folios in the economy decreases. Therefore it is optimal for the IB to demand a
higher rating quality and to pay a higher fee for the CRAs rating service. From the
optimality condition (5) it is obvious that a credit rating becomes more valuable,
the higher is the potential loss m, if the IBs portfolio turns out to be in a bad state,
expressed in a higher amount of debt relative to the portfolios payo¤ in the bad
state. Therefore, a higher rating quality will be demanded by the investment bank.
The last point of Proposition 1 refers to the cost e¢ ciency of CRAs. If the cost
e¢ ciency of CRAs increases - meaning lower marginal costs per rating for a given
quality - IBs would demand a higher rating quality. From a welfare perspective, the
IBs individual gains from getting a credit rating can be interpreted as the "social
value" of a credit rating, where the rst-best rating quality q maximizes the social
value of a credit rating.
ii. More clients than CRAs: If in the economy are more IBs than CRAs
there is market power on the side of CRAs. In that case, the rating fee, required by
the CRA, increases as follows. In order to maximize its prots from "producing"
a credit rating, the CRA will set the rating fee to the highest possible level. It
optimally sets the rating fee such that it is equal to the informative value of a credit
18All proofs are located in the appendix.
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rating for the rated investment bank in equation (3):
 (q) = q (1  p)m
Since we assume that credit ratings are not mandatory, the IB is willing to obtain
a credit rating, if the informative value of the rating minus the rating fee is larger
or equal zero. In case ii. the expected additional prot for the IB of getting rated
will be zero. If the IB would set a higher rating fee, the IB would not be willing
to obtain a credit rating. The decision problem of the CRA is now to choose a
rating quality that maximizes its prot - the di¤erence between the fee per rating
and the costs per rating: CRA (q) = q (1  p)m   c (q). Given the fee setting
behavior above, the maximization problem is exactly the same as in case i. (see
equation (4)) and therefore the supplied rst-best rating quality that maximizes
the prots of the CRA is the same (q = q). The only thing that di¤ers, is the
distribution of the prots originating from the credit rating. In case i., only the IB
prots from getting rated, while in case ii., the value of the credit rating is taken
entirely by the CRA. The overall social surplus of a credit rating is the same in both
cases. Therefore, the characteristics of the rst-best rating quality in equilibrium,
as described in proposition 1, applies for the case of market power of CRAs, too. It
has often been a point of criticism in the real world that CRAs have market power
and that the quality of credit ratings would be higher if there were more competition
in the rating sector. As was shown above, the model concludes that market power
in itself is no reason for regulatory intervention if rating quality is observable and
contractible, since the optimal rating quality is the same in the monopoly and the
perfect competition case.
However, the equilibrium rating quality would change, if the rating quality be-
comes unobservable and not contractible. In that case the CRA has an incentive
to lower rating quality after it was assigned to issue a credit rating, because this
would reduce the rating costs and increase the prots. The model does not consider
a repeated game or a reputation mechanism, instead the model concentrates on pos-
sibilities of regulation in a one period game. Therefore, it is even optimal for the
15
CRA to set the rating quality equal zero after it was hired for a rating service by
the IB, because this would maximize the prot per credit rating. According to the
rating technology, the CRA would in the case of a rating quality of zero issue inac-
curate good credit ratings and the social value of credit ratings would vanish. The
misallocation of funds therefore increases in the case of unobservable rating quality
and a rationale for regulation emerges in order to preserve the potential social value
of credit ratings. Real world experience - as presented by anecdotal evidence in
the introduction - has shown that the threat of losing reputation alone obviously is
not enough to discipline the CRAs. Partnoy (1999) argues that CRAs "have not
maintained good reputations, based on the informational content of their credit rat-
ings. Instead, credit rating agencies have thrived, proted, and become exceedingly
powerful because they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e. the right to be in
compliance with regulation." The next section analyzes the optimal regulation by
a regulator, which sets a minimum rating standard and the implications for social
welfare.
3.3 The Optimal Rating Standard
If rating quality is neither observable nor contractible, the CRA has an incentive
to lower the rating quality. This would decrease the costs per credit rating and
increase the CRAs prots, which again decreases the social value of a credit rating.
In order to preserve the potential social value added of a credit rating, a regulator
can set a minimum rating standard.19 In contrast to auditing rms, CRAs so far
cannot be made liable for consequences of inaccurate credit ratings. This is because
credit ratings are regarded as an opinion, comparable to a report in a newspaper.
The only way to regulate CRAs would be, as in the model on hand, to supervise
the surrounding conditions of the rating process.20 We assume that a regulator
has a costly technology, which may detect whether a CRA incorporates a rating
19The content of minimum rating standards could for example be oversight of CRAs sta¤,
transparency of the rating process or parts of the IOSCO code of conduct fundamentals which
can be summarized in three categories: 1. Quality and integrity of the rating process, 2. CRA
independence and 3. CRA responsibilities to the investing public and issuers. (see IOSCO, 2004)
20Minimum quality standards would be for example prerequisites regarding the sta¤, the IT
systems or the organizational structure of CRAs.
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quality below a certain minimum rating standard, which is set by the regulator.
The detection technology is designed in such a way that the regulator can detect
compliance with a rating standard with a certain probability h 2 [0; 1], which is an
increasing and concave function of the employed costly e¤ort e: h0 (e) > 0, h00 (e) < 0
and h (0) = 0, lim
e!1
h (e)  1, lim
e!1
h0 (e) = 0, lim
e!0
h0 (e) = 1. If the regulator detects
that the rating quality of a CRA is below the rating standard, the CRA has to pay
a penalty . Since a deviating CRA will not be detected with certainty, it faces an
expected penalty P. The prot of the CRA is now given by the fee per rating minus
the costs per rating minus the expected penalty:
CRA (q) =  (q)  c (q)  P
Lemma 1 describes the expected penalty in case of deviation and compliance with
the rating standard.
Lemma 1 If the regulator sets a rating standard q^, and if deviation from the stand-
ard is detected with probability h (e), the CRA faces an expected penalty P with
P =

h (e) , if q < q^
0, if q  q^ .
Since we assume limited liability of the CRA, the penalty  in case of deviation
from the rating standard and detection by the regulator has an upper limit. This
upper limit can be characterized by the total wealth W of the CRA, accumulated
from past activities plus the rating prots in the actual period in the case of deviation
from the rating standard (i.e. c(q) = 0):   W + .
The sequence of events in the model is summarized in gure 2. At rst, nature
determines, whether the portfolio of the IB is good or bad. In the next step, the
regulator has to decide on the rating standard q^, the penalty for the CRA in case of
deviation from the standard , and the e¤ort employed in the detection technology
e. Taking the parameters, chosen by the regulator, as given, the IB decides to buy a
credit rating at quality q^, if the informational value of the credit rating is larger or
equal zero and pays the rating fee . Then the CRA decides on the rating quality q
and issues a credit rating (r = b or r = g). After the credit rating is published, the
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Figure 2: Sequence of events.
regulator detects deviation from the rating standard with probability h(e) and the
CRA has to pay the penalty  in case of deviation from the standard. Debt nance
d is being provided, conditional on the issued credit rating, and nally, the value of
the portfolio (	g or 	b) materializes.
We assume that the objective of the regulator is to maximize the social value
(V ) of the credit rating. If we take into account that regulation needs costly e¤ort
e, the decision problem of the regulator is to maximize the social value of the credit
rating, given by equation (4), minus the e¤ort costs of regulation e, by deciding on
the rating standard q, the detection e¤ort e and the penalty :
max
q^;e;
V (q^) = q (1  p)m  c (q)  e (6)
The incentive compatibility constraint that induces the CRA to comply with the
rating standard is given by:
 (q^)  c (q^)  P (q  q^)   (q^)  c (q)  P (q < q^) (7)
The incentive compatibility constraint states that the expected prot of the CRA in
case of compliance with the rating standard net of rating costs and expected penalty
must be larger or equal the expected prot in case of deviation from the standard
net of the expected penalty. Since in the case of deviation the CRA chooses the
lowest rating quality q = 0 in order to minimize costs (c (0) = 0), and since the
optimal policy of the regulator requires the incentive compatibility constraint to be
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binding, equation (7) can be rewritten, using lemma 1, as:
c (q^) = h (e)  (8)
The rating costs c are increasing and convex in q 2 [0; 1] and the probability that
regulation will detect deviation from the rating standard h (e), which could be con-
sidered as the e¢ ciency of regulation, is monotonous increasing and concave in the
employed e¤ort e as we have dened above. Therefore, the function h (e) can be
inverted and equation (8) be solved for the optimal regulatory e¤ort, depending on
the quality standard q^, and be rewritten as:
e (q^) = h 1

c (q^)


(9)
This function reveals the optimal regulation e¤ort for a given quality standard, such
that the quality standard is implementable, meaning that the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding. For a given penalty and due to the assumed characteristics
of the cost function c(q), the optimal e¤ort, which is employed in regulation, is
increasing and convex in the rating standard q^. The intuition of this equation is
straightforward. If the rating standard increases, the costs of rating increase, too.
Therefore, the incentive for a CRA to deviate from the standard (i.e. setting the
rating quality equal zero) increases. In order to make the higher standard incentive
compatible, the expected penalty must increase. For a given penalty , the regulator
has to increase e¤ort e to implement the more demanding rating standard q^. We
have mentioned above that due to limited liability, the penalty, the CRA has to
pay in case of deviation from the standard is limited by the wealth, accumulated
in the past plus the prots of rating in the actual period. Furthermore, equation
(6) shows that e¤ort, employed in regulation, reduces social welfare. In order to set
the expected penalty such that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, it
is optimal from a welfare perspective, to set the penalty in case of deviation to its
highest possible level: ^ = W + . A lower penalty would require the regulator to
employ more e¤ort to keep h (e)  constant, which would reduce social value.
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The maximization problem of the regulator in equation (6) can now be reduced
to the optimal choice of the rating standard. The optimal penalty is given by ^ and
the optimal e¤ort e is the optimal response to q according to equation (9). Inserting
equation (9) in equation (6) leads to:
max
q^
V^ (q^) = q^ (1  p)m  c (q^)  e (q^)
Because rating costs and e¤ort costs are convex in the rating quality, the objective
function leads to an interior solution. The rst-order condition is given by:
(1  p)m = c0 (q^) + e0 (q^) ;
which leads to the optimal rating standard that maximizes social welfare, under the
assumption that rating quality is unobservable. In part 3.2 we have shown that
the rst-best rating quality in the case of observable and contractible rating quality
was given by (1  p)m = c0 (q). A comparison with the optimal rating standard
under regulation shows that q^ < q. The intuition is straightforward. Monitoring of
a certain rating standard is costly, which reduces social welfare. Therefore a lower
rating standard compared to the rst-best will be implemented by the regulator. The
inuence of the exogenous parameters is analog to proposition 1 and are summarized
in proposition 2 point (i) to (iii). Additionally, the optimal rating standard is
increasing in the e¢ ciency of regulation (i.e. the optimal rating standard is higher,
if the marginal e¤ort costs of increasing the standard are lower).
Proposition 2 A regulator, who maximizes social welfare, chooses a rating stand-
ard q^ which is lower than the rst-best rating standard q. The optimal rating stand-
ard q^ becomes
(i) smaller, if the unconditional probability of the IBs portfolio being in a good
state p increases.
(ii) larger, if the size of the potential misallocation of investment m without
increases.
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(iii) larger, if the cost e¢ ciency of the CRA and the regulator increases.
(iv) The optimal rating standard q^ is higher, if the wealth of the CRA increases.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Part (iv) of proposition 2 implicitly points to the di¤erence in the optimal rating
standard in the case, where CRAs make zero prots, i.e. "perfect competition" on
the CRA market, and the case, where CRAs takes the informational value of rating,
i.e. the "market power case" (see for these two cases part 3.2). In the market power
case (m), the wealth of the CRA that can be penalized by the regulator may be
assumed to be larger than the wealth in the perfect competition case (c). Therefore,
the optimal penalty, which is set by the regulator, would have the following property:
^m > ^c. The modied incentive compatibility constraint (9) shows that the optimal
regulatory e¤ort for a given rating standard is decreasing as the optimal penalty
increases. Therefore, enforcement of regulation becomes more e¢ cient, if the CRA
has "more to lose", since less costly e¤ort has to be employed to enforce a given
rating standard. From this follows that costly regulatory e¤ort has a less negative
impact on social welfare. The optimal rating standard increases, if the representative
CRA has more to lose, i.e. if the CRA has a higher "charter value". The model
shows again that from this perspective, market power of some few CRAs is not in
itself a rationale for regulatory intervention. In the rst-best case, where rating
quality is assumed to be observable and contractible, the optimal rating quality and
social value of ratings is independent of the structure of the CRA market. In the
case of unobservable rating quality, the model shows that a higher charter value of
CRAs moves the optimal rating standard and social value of credit ratings closer to
the rst-best result.21
21However, even if this is true in the framework used here, this nding should be read with
caution with regards to generalization. The only consequence of market power in the model is that
the surplus of credit ratings is reallocated from the IB to the CRA, the overall surplus remains
unchanged. The model does not take into account potential adverse e¤ects of CRA market power
with consequences on the level of the rating fee and the overall social value of credit ratings.
Ine¢ cient high rating fees might for example induce the debt issuer to engage in riskier portfolios,
which may decrease nancial market stability.
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4 Conicts of Interest and Optimal Regulation
So far, the unobservability of rating qualities was considered as the only rationale for
the regulation of CRAs. What has not yet been included in the model are potential
adverse e¤ects of conicts of interest between the CRA and the rated rm (in our
framework the rated IB). One potential source of conicts of interest is the fact
that credit ratings usually are paid by the issuer of a debt instrument and not by
the investors. Facing the fact that since the early 197022 CRAs mainly are paid by
their clients23, the client could in principle directly bribe the CRA in exchange for
a better credit rating. Another potential conict of interest emerged in the special
role of CRAs in the rise of structured nance products during the last years. While
interaction between the issuer of a traditional debt security and the CRA was rather
limited, the case is di¤erent in the rating of structured nance transactions. In the
rating process of those structured nance products, CRAs are involved in an iterative
process with the issuer. The structuring process of these products includes implicit
structuring advice by the CRAs, meaning that the CRA indicates what needs to be
done to receive the desired credit rating.24 Broadly speaking, CRAs not only o¤er
the service of the pure rating, but also o¤er additional consulting services. This
deeper involvement of CRAs has been heavily criticized in the public, especially
in association with the crisis in the subprime loan market. This problematic is
also captured to some degree in the U.S. "Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006",
which among others "directs the SEC to issue nal rules to prohibit unfair, coercive,
or abusive acts or practices by NRSROs25 [...] such as conditioning or threatening
22For an overview on the history of credit rating agencies see for example Hill (2004) or Cantor
& Packer (1995).
23An argument for this payment scheme is the emergence of information technology during the
last 30 years, which gave information, once it is originated a public good character (a single investor
would only be willing to pay for a rating if it is not made public). Another argument is that it is
more e¢ cient to let the issuer pay instead of each single investor of a large and dispersed investor
community, that uses the credit rating for its investment decision. (see White, 2001)
24For a summary of the role of CRAs in structured ncance products see Mason & Rosner (2007)
and BIS (2005). According to BIS (2005) "[...] it has become common for rating agencies to o¤er
special services relating to rmsbond ratings [...] that could impact rating levels. These services
may be separately rewarded and may thus exacerbate any potential conicts of interst arising from
issuer fees."
25NRSRO = nationally recognized statistical rating organization; a CRA has to be recognized
by the SEC (securities and exchange commission), in order to be used for regulatory purposes. The
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to condition an issuers credit rating on the purchase of other services or products"
(see CRA Reform Act, 2006). Based on Pagano & Immordino (2007) for the case of
auditing rms, we extend in the following section the model by allowing the CRA to
o¤er additionally consulting services to the rated investment bank (IB). We assume
that the portfolio, for which the IB seeks debt nance from external investors, is
managed by a portfolio-manager, whos salary partly consists of a payment which
is proportionally to the volume of managed portfolios. Hence, the manager has an
interest that the IB receives nancing by external investors with certainty, since
this would increase his salary. As we have shown above, external investors only
nance a portfolio, if it receives a good credit rating (r = g), therefore the portfolio-
manager has an incentive to engage in activities to ensure a high credit rating for
the portfolio.26 One possibility to achieve that goal would be a direct bribe to the
CRA in exchange for a higher credit rating. Another way of modelling conicts of
interest in our model arises from the joint provision of credit ratings and consulting
services by a single CRA, from which emerges a more sophisticated possibility of
collusion between the CRA and the rated IB as follows. Since the CRA is very well
informed about its client in the course of the rating process, we assume that the
CRA has the expertise to o¤er consulting services to the IB at lower costs compared
with competitors due to economies of scope. The possibility of collusion now arises,
if the IB is only willing to pay for an additional consulting contract, if in exchange
the CRA issues a good credit rating. Since we assume that the CRA can provide
such services at lower costs, the received market fee for the consulting service can be
regarded as a rent for the CRA. The conict of interest is clear: the consulting fee
acts as a bribe, and the CRA only gets the fee in exchange for a good credit rating.
Section 4.1 extends the model and analyzes consequences for the optimal rating
standard which is set by the regulator. In section 4.2, we analyze, if forbidding the
joint provision of rating and consulting services is optimal from a welfare perspective.
"Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006" includes the simplication of the recognition process.
26Note, that we assume that the IB decides to get rated only, if the informational value of a
credit rating is larger or equal zero (see section 3.1).
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4.1 Optimal Rating Standard in the Presence of Conicts
of Interest
The analysis is now extended by assuming that the IB employs a portfolio-manager,
whose salary consists of a proportion  2 [0; 1] of the portfolio value. After de-
ducting the rating fee and repayment of debt to external investors, the net prot
of the IB after the true value of the portfolio materialized with consideration of
the management compensation, is given by: ~	      d   ~	. According to the
compensation scheme, the manager has an interest that investment takes place with
certainty, which is the case without a credit rating and with a "good" credit rating
r = g. Therefore, the manager - if he is opportunistic - has an incentive to induce
the CRA to issue a good credit rating. The manager - who requires the CRA to issue
a good credit rating in exchange - may either bribe the CRA directly by o¤ering a
bribe  > 0 or indirectly by engaging the CRA for rating and additional consulting
services. In the following it will be shown that both forms of corruption have similar
implications regarding the optimal rating standard. The CRA is assumed to be able
to o¤er consulting services additionally to the rating service. Due to economies of
scope, the CRA is assumed to o¤er the same consulting service as an external com-
petitor (Comp:) at lower costs : CRA < Comp:.
27 Under the assumption of perfect
competition in the consulting sector, the market consulting fee ' is equal to the
consulting costs: ' = Comp:. If the CRA, instead of an external rm, gets employed
for performing the consulting service, the CRA receives the market consulting fee '
and therefore earns a rent   '   CRA > 0. At the same time, making use of
the CRAs economies of scope, the rent  increases social welfare, due to e¢ ciency
gains.
Given those assumptions, the portfolio-manager has an incentive to o¤er a con-
sulting contract, contingent on a good credit rating. If the CRA accepts this o¤er,
the prots of the CRA from rating and consulting are given as follows:
CRA (q) =  (q)  c (q) + '  CRA   P (10)
27From performing the rating procedure, we assume that the CRA has gained expertise to o¤er
additional consulting at lower costs, compared to a third competitior.
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The requirement for getting o¤ered the contract for the joint provision of credit
rating and consulting is that the CRA issues a good credit rating. Therefore, it is
optimal for the CRA to set q = 0, since that minimizes the costs (i.e. c (0) = 0).
Using   '   CRA > 0 and considering the expected penalty in the case of
deviation from the rating standard h (e) ^, equation (10) can be rewritten as:
CRA (q) =  (q) +   h (e) ^ (10)
Now it is obvious that the additional rent for the consulting service acts as a bribe.
The bribe makes sure that the IB receives a good credit rating and that nancing
by external investors happens for sure. Therefore, the portfolio-manager gets the
partial salary ~	 with certainty. In the case of a direct bribe , the prot equation
can be formulated analogously by replacing  with . While the consequences
of corruption regarding the social value are clear in the case of the direct bribe,
they are twofold in the case of joint provision of services. In both cases the IB
receives a good credit rating and the IBs portfolio receives even then nancing, if
the portfolio would have received a bad credit rating without the bribe. Henceforth,
the misallocation of funds increases, which reduces the social value of a credit rating.
An additional positive impact on the social value occurs with the joint provision of
services, because the CRA is assumed to o¤er consulting services more e¢ ciently in
terms of costs compared to a third party. Therefore, the social value increases by
 in that case. We assume that the possibility of collusion cannot be prevented
by the external investors, since the large investors community is assumed to have
a collective action problem.28 Taking into account the opposed e¤ects of the joint
provision of services by a single CRA and the possibility of collusion, the decision
problem of the regulator, who maximizes the social value of rating, is given by29:
max
~q;e
~V (~q) = ~q (1  p)m+  c (~q)  e (11)
28If any collective action restrictions would be absent, investors could make the debt nancing
dependend on the requirement, that consulting and rating by the same rm is impossible.
29The e¢ ciency gain is integrated into the social value function in the most easiest way by simply
adding . In the case of a direct bribe  the positive e¤ect on social welfare would be absent and
the objective function of the regulator is the same as equation (5) in section 3.3.
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The rating standard in the presence of possible collusion is denoted by ~q. The
new incentive compatibility constraint requires the CRAs prot from rating and
compliance with the rating standard, set by the regulator, to be larger or equal the
CRAs prot in the case of joint provision of services and acceptance of the bribe,
given by equation (10):
 (~q)  c (~q)   (~q) +   h (e) ^
In the case of a direct bribe,  in the incentive compatibility constraint has to
be replaced by . The optimal rating standard has to be chosen such that it is
implementable by the CRA and collusion does not happen. According to section
3.3, the incentive compatibility constraint can be reformulated as the optimal e¤ort,
employed in regulation, as a function of the optimal rating standard, which assures
the constraint being binding:
e (~q) = h 1

c (~q) + 
^

(12)
As equation (9) in section 3.3.3, the optimal e¤ort is increasing and convex in the
rating standard. But in contrast to equation (9), the optimal e¤ort, given a certain
rating standard is now higher, since the numerator increases by  in equation
(12).30 In that case, more costly e¤ort has to be employed by the regulator to make
a given rating standard incentive compatible. Using equation (12) in equation (11),
maximizing with respect to ~q leads to the following rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q)
Proposition 3 describes the properties of the new optimal rating standard:
Proposition 3 If the rent from the joint provision of services is  > 0 or if
there is the possibility of a direct bribe  > 0, the optimal rating standard in the
presence of potential collusion between CRA and IB is lower than the optimal rating
30Analogously, in the case of a direct bribe the optimal e¤ort, which assures the incentive com-
patibility constraint being binding, can be rewritten as: e (~q) = h 1

c(~q)+
^

.
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standard without the possibility of collusion: ~q < q^. The optimal rating standard
is decreasing, if the rent of the joint provision of services  or the direct bribe 
increase.
Proof. See appendix A.3.
If there were no e¢ ciency gains from the joint provision of services, the bribe
would be zero:  = 0. In that case the optimal rating standard is the same as in
section 3.3., where rating service only is considered: ~q = q^. Accordingly, the optimal
rating standard is the same (~q = q^), if the regulator would forbid the joint provision
of services by the CRA or the possibility of a direct bribe, since the possibility of
collusion would then be eliminated. The intuition of why ~q < q^ is straightforward, if
 > 0 or  > 0. The corresponding e¤ort that has to be employed by the regulator
for a given rating standard is now higher as shown in equation (12). Since an increase
of costly regulatory e¤ort decreases the social value, the regulator chooses a lower
rating standard. If the rent  or the direct bribe  increase, also the incentive
for the CRA to accept the bribe and collude with the IB increases. Therefore it
is optimal for the regulator to set a lower rating standard, since that would reduce
the CRAs cost in the case of compliance with the standard. In principle, one of
the two sources of potential collusion can be prevented by the regulator by simply
forbidding the joint provision of rating and consulting services. That issue has
also been discussed by the SEC and the European Commission in reaction to the
inglorious role of CRAs in the subprime loan crisis in 2007 and been addressed in
the "Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006" in the US. While collusion through
the joint provision of services cannot be presumed ex ante by the regulator, the
intention for corruption is obvious for the case of a direct bribe. For the remainder
of the paper is assumed that direct bribes, for example in the form of extra payments
or rating fees above the market level, would easily be detectable by the regulator
and the analysis concentrates on the more sophisticated form of collusion - namely
conicts of interest via the joint provision of services. Whether the joint provision
of services should be prohibited by regulation from a welfare perspective, will be
analyzed in the next section.
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4.2 Regulatory Intervention and Social Value
The model showed that the consulting fee can be used by the client to bribe the
CRA to issue an inaccurate higher credit rating, if a CRA o¤ers both ratings and
consulting services. As already mentioned above, the role of CRAs in the past years
changed from a passive to a more active part particularly in the rating process of
structured debt products, such as collateralized debt obligations. In an iterative pro-
cess, CRAs are involved in advising their clients in designing products that receive
the desired high credit rating to be attractive for the investors community. CRAs
have been heavily criticized for this behavior in the recent past, as they were under
suspicion of being exposed to conicts of interest, therefore being jointly respons-
ible for the nancial market crisis in 2007 by issuing inaccurate credit ratings. The
models answer to a situation with existing conicts of interest is that the regulator
should either simply choose a lower rating standard or forbid the joint provision of
services and eliminate the potential conict of interest at its root. In the latter case
the regulator chooses optimally a higher rating standard, as shown in the previous
section. But what has not been analyzed so far, is the question, whether the regu-
lator should allow of forbid the joint provision of services, if the decision criterion is
the social value.31 The objective function of the regulator in the presence of conicts
of interest was given by:
max
~q
~V (~q) = ~q (1  p)m+  c (~q)  h 1

c (~q) + 
^

(13)
As we have shown above, the CRA - if it is hired for creating a credit rating - can
provide consulting services more e¢ ciently in comparison to external competitors
by being able to provide the same service at lower costs. This e¢ ciency gain ,
that can be used by the rated IB to bribe the CRA, on the one hand increases the
social value. This positive e¤ect would be lost, if the regulator would forbid the
joint provision of services. On the other hand, the joint provision of services makes
31In the case of a direct bribe () without joint provision of services, the implication for regulation
is very easy: "forbidding" to accept the direct bribe increases the social value of rating, because
there is no potential e¢ ciency gain and no trade-o¤ from allowing the possibility of collusion in
that case.
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collusion possible and the nancing of bad portfolios more likely, which decreases
the social value. As the e¢ ciency gain has one negative and one positive e¤ect
on the social value, the answer is now, under which circumstances the regulator
optimally should allow or forbid the joint provision of activities. If the regulator
forbids the bundling of services, the social welfare of the credit rating is V^ (q^), as
dened in section 3.3. In the following, we compare the social value in the case of
joint provision of services (case 1: ~V (~q)), with the social value, if CRAs are allowed
to o¤er ratings only (case 2: V^ (q^))32. The partial e¤ect of an increase of  on the
social value in case 2 is zero (@V^ =@ = 0), while in case 1 is given by
@ ~V
@
= 1  h 10 (:::) 1
^
(14)
Depending on the size of equation (14), i.e. whether 1 ? h 10 (:::) 1
^
, the social value
can either increase or decrease as  increases. Therefore, obviously one criterion
for the regulators decision is the size of , as the e¤ect on the social value could
be positive or negative for di¤ering values. The previous section has shown that
the necessary e¤ort for a given rating quality increases as  becomes larger. From
this follows that h 10 (:::) in equation (14) is a positive and increasing function of
. If equation (14) is negative at  = 0, it remains negative for any  > 0. In
that case, despite of the e¢ ciency gain, it is optimal for the regulator to prohibit
the joint provision of services, because ~V < V^ for all  > 0. If equation (14) is
positive at  = 0, it becomes negative, if  becomes su¢ ciently large. In that
case, there exists a threshold value for the size of  = , below which it is
optimal for the regulator to allow the joint provision of services (case 1), since the
positive e¤ects on the social value overweigh (~V  V^ for 0    ). On the
other side for  >  it is optimal to forbid the joint provision of ratings and
consulting services, since the adverse e¤ects of conicts of interest dominate (~V < V^
for > ). To analyze the determinants for the decision of the regulator, besides
the size of the e¢ ciency gain (which works in our model as a bribe) further, equation
32The objective function if the CRA o¤ers the service of rating only was given by V^ (q^) =
q^ (1  p)m  c (q^)  h 1

c(q^)
^

(see section 3.3).
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(14) can be rewritten as follows33:
@ ~V
@
=
1
c0 (~q)
(c0 (~q)  e0 (~q)) (15)
Equation (15) is negative for any positive value of , if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0.
While c0 (~q) can be interpreted as the marginal costs of rating, and therefore as the
cost e¢ ciency of CRAs, e0 (~q) can be interpreted as the e¢ ciency of the regulation
technology. Above, the regulation technology was characterized by the probability
to detect deviation from a certain rating standard by employing costly e¤ort e. A
more e¢ cient regulation technology would require less e¤ort to enforce a given rating
standard and henceforth a lower increase of e¤ort if the rating standard increases
(e0high (~q) < e
0
low (~q)). If the e¢ ciency of the rating technology is su¢ ciently low,
such that c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, it is optimal for the regulator to forbid the
joint provision of services for any positive value of , since the social value in
case of the joint provision of services is always smaller, compared to case 2 (~V (~q) <
V^ (q^)). Proposition 4 describes the optimal decision of the regulator, if the regulation
technology is too ine¢ cient.
Proposition 4 If the regulation technology is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, such that
c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, the optimal strategy for the regulator is to forbid the
joint provision of services and to set the optimal rating standard q = q^. Otherwise
the social value of rating would be ine¢ ciently low for any  > 0: ~V (~q) < V^ (q^).
Proof. See appendix A.4.
While the decision between case 1 and case 2 is clear and independent of the
size of , if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, the decision problem looks di¤erent, if the
e¢ ciency of the regulation technology is su¢ ciently high. If the regulation techno-
logy is such that c0 (~q) > e0 (~q) at  = 0, equation (15) is positive as  increases
and becomes negative, if  becomes su¢ ciently large. This is true, because c0 (~q)
33The derivation of equation (15) is located in appendix B.
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becomes smaller and e0 (~q) becomes larger as  increases.34 From this follows that
for c0 (~q) > e0 (~q) at  = 0 the optimal decision of the regulator for one of the two
alternatives depends on the size of the e¢ ciency gain . Proposition 5 describes
the optimal decision of the regulator.
Proposition 5 If the regulation technology is su¢ ciently e¢ cient such that c0 (q^) >
e0 (q^) at  = 0, and the size of the e¢ ciency gain is below its critical value,  <
, the optimal strategy for the regulator is to allow the joint provision of services
and to set the optimal rating standard ~q < q^, since ~V (~q) > V^ (q^) for  < . If
the e¢ ciency gain is larger than its critical value,  > , the optimal strategy
is to forbid the joint provision of services and to set the optimal rating standard q^,
since ~V (~q) < V^ (q^) for  > .
Proof. See appendix A.5.
The model shows that the joint provision of services - for example expressed by
the deep involvement of CRAs in the rating process of structured nance products,
such as collateralized debt obligations - is not necessarily a root of ine¢ ciency for
which regulatory intervention could be justied. If the criterion for the regulator
is social welfare, the decision of the regulator on the optimal rating standard and
possible restrictions of activities depends on the surrounding conditions. If the
potential bribe is large enough, it is optimal to restrict the activities of CRAs, as
the negative e¤ects of collusion dominate.35 But it could be optimal to allow the
joint provision of services, if the bribe is low enough, since the positive e¤ects of
the e¢ ciency gain dominate in that case. Additionally, the model shows that the
basic requirement for the strategy of allowing the joint provision of services lies in
34Proposition 3 in the previous section has shown that @~q@ < 0. Because of the convexity of c(:)
follows that @c
0(:)
@ < 0. For the derivation of
@e0(:)
@ , see the proof of proposition 4 in the appendix.
35One implication of the model is to forbid the joint provision of services if consulting services
could be provided very e¢ ciently (i.e. if  > ). The argument is that in those cases the
incentive of the CRA to collude with the IB is so high such that the social value of ratings becomes
ine¢ ciently low. A possibility to get rid of the collusion problem and to prot from the welfare
increasing e¢ cient provision of consulting services would be for the CRA to create rewalls and
for the regulator to check their e¤ectiveness. The integration of this aspect in the model is one
possible extension for future research.
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the hand of the regulator, meaning that the e¢ ciency of the regulation technology
has to be su¢ ciently high.
5 Conclusion
The discussion on the role and power of CRAs in nancial markets is an ongoing
debate among academics, practitioners, and institutions of nancial supervision.36
Many times, CRAs were suspected for having issued inaccurate credit ratings or
having updated already issued credit ratings too late. Furthermore, CRAs were
suspected to be exposed to various conicts of interest. Jochen Sanio, the chairman
of the German federal nancial supervision authority (Ban), once blamed CRAs
to be the "largest uncontrolled power in the global nancial system".37 On the role
of CRAs in the subprime loan crisis, Keneth Rogo¤ presumed that ""[...] rating
agencies cooperated too closely with the banks and received a much too high pay-
ment for their ratings." and "I could imagine that Moodys will become the Arthur
Andersen of this decade"(see Zeit, 2007).
The applied model, which is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), has shown
that intransparency of how credit ratings are generated by CRAs, could be a ra-
tionale for regulation. Without regulation, the quality of the credit ratings would
be ine¢ ciently low and misallocation of investment ine¢ ciently high. Minimum
rating standards, which can be enforced by costly regulation, would increase the
social value of credit ratings in the applied model. The adverse e¤ects of conicts
of interest were analyzed in the model, too. By the joint provision of credit ratings
and consulting services, we have shown that on the one hand there is the threat of
collusion, which may lead to inaccurate credit ratings, but on the other hand that
potential e¢ ciency gains are present, too. In the presented theory, the potential con-
ict of interest can be prevented by simply constraining the activities of CRAs. It
has also been discussed that this regulatory intervention may or may not be optimal
36See for example IOSCO (2004, 2007) and CRA Reform Act (2006).
37Own translation from German to English. This quote is from a public hearing of the nancial
committe of the German Bundestag at June 4th 2003.
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from a welfare perspective.
The results of that paper on the one hand gives a contribution to the theoretical
academic literature on CRAs, by modelling the optimal regulation of CRAs in the
presence of unobservable rating quality and conicts of interest. On the other hand,
the analysis, presented in this paper, also contributes to the discussion about the
possibility and necessity to regulate activities of CRAs that is consistently present
among institutions of nancial market regulation as well as observers and practi-
tioners of nancial markets, especially in the aftermath of the subprime loan crisis
in 2007. A frequent argument against regulation of CRAs in the past was that
CRAs have a strong incentive to issue accurate credit ratings, because otherwise
they would lose their reputation, which is regarded to be the most important asset
of CRAs.38 Therefore it was argued that self-regulation among CRAs works well
and no further regulation would be necessary.
However, a necessary requirement for self-regulation is competition and the pos-
sibility of market entry for competitors. Due to the market power of some few
CRAs and the heavy criticism, CRAs were confronted with in the past, it is disput-
able whether the threat of losing reputation is enough to prevent CRAs from issuing
inaccurate credit ratings and colluding with debt issuers. Regarding this limited
competition, Partnoy (1999) argues that markets may become inattentive as to the
CRAsreputation as soon as some few CRAs have received recognition status by the
regulator. As soon as self-regulation of CRAs fails, the results of our paper provide
insights for the optimal regulation of CRAs.
38see for example Schwarcz (2001).
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Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of proposition 1.
The optimal rating quality q 2 [0; 1] is derived by the rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (q) (A1.)
E¤ect of p: As p increases, the left hand side of A1. becomes smaller. To keep
equality, the right hand side has to become smaller, too. Due to the characteristics
of the cost function c(:), the optimal rating quality q has to decrease.
E¤ect of m: m increases, if d increases and/or 	b decreases. The left hand side
increases, therefore the optimal rating quality q has to increase, too.
E¤ect of c0 (q): A more e¢ cient rating technology is expressed with lower costs
for a given rating standard. If rating quality increases, the rise of costs is lower for a
more e¢ cient technology: c0high (q) < c
0
low (q). The marginal rating costs for a given
rating quality is lower, if cost e¢ ciency becomes higher. The value of left hand side
is exogenous and constant. If cost e¢ ciency increases q, the rating standard has to
rise in order to keep the right hand side constant.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2.
The optimal rating standard if rating quality q^ is unobservable and with costly
regulation is derived by the rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (q^) + e0 (q^) (A2.)
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As the left hand side of (A2.) is the same as the left hand side of (A1.), we have:
c0 (q) = c0 (q^) + e0 (q^) (A.2)
Since c(:) and e(:) are increasing and convex in q, therefore q has to be larger than
q^: q > q^.
For the proof of parts (i) to (iii) of proposition 2 see the proof of proposition
1. Part (iv) claims that the optimal rating standard is higher, if optimal penalty ^
increases. An example for a rise in ^ is an increase in the prots per rating due to
market power in the CRA sector. The necessary e¤ort that has to be employed in
order to enforce a given rating standard, is given by:
e (q^) = h 1

c (q^)
^

(A3.)
If ^ increases, the optimal e¤ort corresponding to a given rating standard decreases.
From this follows that the marginal e¤ort e0(:) decreases either. The right hand side
therefore becomes smaller for a given rating standard. Due to the characteristics of
the functions c(:) and e(:), the optimal rating standard q^ must increase to ensure
equality of equation (A.3).
A.3 Proof of proposition 3.
Why the optimal rating standard in the presence of joint provision of services (~q) and
analogously in the case of a direct bribe, is lower than the optimal rating standard in
3.3 (q^), can be shown as follows: The rst-order condition of the regulators decision
problem is given by
(1  p)m = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q) (A.4)
The left hand side of A4. the same as in equation A.2, therefore it must be true
that:
c0 (q^) + e0 (q^) = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q) (A.4)
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Since the e¤ects are analog for the direct () and the indirect bribe (), the proof
is presented for  > 0 only. Taking into account the potential bribe , the
necessary e¤ort to enforce a given rating standard q is larger in the case of joint
provision of services:
e (q) = h 1

c (q)
^

< e (q) = h 1

c (q) + 
^

The marginal e¤ort with bribe is therefore larger than the marginal e¤ort without
bribe for a given rating quality. Therefore the optimal rating standard has to be
lower in the case of joint provision of services, to ensure equality of equation (A.4),
given the characteristics of c(:) and e(:): ~q < q^.
That the optimal rating standard is decreasing as the rent of the joint provision
of services increases can be shown by total di¤erentiating equation (A.4) and using
e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
^

c0(~q)
^
:
d (1  p)m| {z }
=0
= c00 (~q) d~q + e00 (~q) d~q + h00 1

c (~q) + 
^

c0 (~q)
^2
d
 ! d~q
d
=  
h00 1

c(~q)+
^

c0(~q)
^2
c00 (~q) + e00 (~q)
< 0 (A.5)
Equation is smaller than zero, because of the convexity of e(:), c(:), and h 1(). 
A.4 Proof of proposition 4.
The social value with joint provision of services is given by ~V , whereas the social
value with rating only is given by V^ . If  = 0, then ~V = V^ . Equation (A.5)
showed that d~q
d
< 0. Therefore, given the characteristics of c(:), it must be true that
@c0(~q)
@
< 0. Above, we have shown that e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
^

c0(~q)
^
. Di¤erentiating
with respect to  yields @e
0(~q)
@
= h00 1

c(~q)+
^

c0(~q)
^2
> 0. The partial derivative of
the social value ~V and V^ with respect to  is given by: @ ~V
@
= 1
c0(~q) (c
0 (~q)  e0 (~q))
and @V^
@
= 0. As  increases, the di¤erence (c0 (~q)  e0 (~q)) decreases, since c0
decreases and e0 increases. If @ ~V
@
< 0 at  = 0, which is the case if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q),
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the social value ~V decreases further as  increases. Therefore, it is optimal to
prevent the joint provision of services for any  > 0, since ~V < V^ . 
A.5 Proof of proposition 5.
If @ ~V
@
> 0 at  = 0, then we must have c0 (~q) > e0 (~q). From this follows that
~V increases, if  becomes larger, as long as  is relatively small. Given the
characteristics of @c
0(~q)
@
and @e
0(~q)
@
, ~V decreases, for relatively large values of .
Therefore, at some critical level  = , we have ~V = V^ . For values  < ,
we have ~V > V^ , and therefore allowing the joint provision of services is optimal.
For values  > , we have ~V < V^ , and therefore forbidding the joint provision
of services is optimal.
B Derivation of Equation (15)
The necessary regulation e¤ort for a given rating standard is given by: e (~q) =
h 1

c(~q)+
^

. Di¤erentiating with respect to ~q leads to e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
^

c0(~q)
^
and after rearranging:
e0 (~q)
c0 (~q)
= h0 1

c (~q) + 
^

1
^
(A.6)
Inserting equation (A.6) into equation (14): @ ~V
@
= 1   h0 1

c(~q)+
^

1
^
leads to
equation (15):
@ ~V
@
= 1  e
0 (~q)
c0 (~q)
 ! @
~V
@
=
1
c0 (~q)
(c0 (~q)  e0 (~q))
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